Using Property-Based Oracles when Testing Embedded System Applications by Yu, Tingting et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
CSE Conference and Workshop Papers Computer Science and Engineering, Department of 
2011 
Using Property-Based Oracles when Testing Embedded System 
Applications 
Tingting Yu 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, tyu@cse.unl.edu 
Ahyoung Sung 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., ahyoung.sung@samsung.com 
Witawas Srisaan 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, witty@cse.unl.edu 
Gregg Rothermel 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, gerother@ncsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Yu, Tingting; Sung, Ahyoung; Srisaan, Witawas; and Rothermel, Gregg, "Using Property-Based Oracles 
when Testing Embedded System Applications" (2011). CSE Conference and Workshop Papers. 210. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork/210 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in CSE Conference and 
Workshop Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Using Property-Based Oracles when Testing Embedded System Applications
Tingting Yu
Computer Science and Engineering
U. of Nebraska - Lincoln
Lincoln, NE, USA
tyu@cse.unl.edu
Ahyoung Sung
Division of Visual Display
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Suwon, Gyounggi, South Korea
ahyoung.sung@samsung.com
Witawas Srisa-an, Gregg Rothermel
Computer Science and Engineering
U. of Nebraska - Lincoln
Lincoln, NE, USA
{witty, grother}@cse.unl.edu
Abstract—Embedded systems are becoming increasingly
ubiquitous, controlling a wide variety of popular and safety-
critical devices. Effective testing techniques could improve the
dependability of these systems. In prior work we presented an
approach for testing embedded systems, focusing on embedded
system applications and the tasks that comprise them. In this
work we focus on a second but equally important aspect
of testing embedded systems; namely, the need to provide
observability of system behavior sufficient to allow engineers
to detect failures. We present several property-based oracles
that can be instantiated in embedded systems through program
analysis and instrumentation, and can detect failures for which
simple output-based oracles are inadequate. An empirical study
of our approach shows that it can be effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems are used to control a wide variety of
applications, ranging from non-safety-critical systems such
as cellular phones and televisions to safety-critical systems
such as automobiles, airplanes, and medical devices. Clearly,
systems such as these must be sufficiently dependable. There
is ample evidence, however, that faults in embedded systems
have led to numerous failures [16].
To address dependability problems in embedded systems,
researchers have proposed various approaches ranging from
formal verification to testing techniques (e.g., [6], [14], [21],
[32]). On our analysis of prior work, however (Section II-C),
one need that has not been sufficiently addressed is to
provide methodologies by which the developers of embedded
system applications — which run in environments supported
by a wide range of underlying software components such as
middle-ware, operating system kernels, device drivers, and
hardware-related utilities — can cost-effectively test those
applications in the context of those environments.
In previous work [31], we presented an approach to help
developers of embedded system applications detect faults
that occur as their applications interact with underlying
system components. Our approach involves two dataflow-
based test adequacy criteria. First, we use dataflow analysis
to identify inter-layer interactions between application code
and lower-level (kernel and hardware-related) components
in embedded systems. Second, we use a further dataflow
analysis to identify inter-task interactions between tasks that
are initiated by the application. Application developers then
create and execute test cases targeting these interactions.
Helping engineers create test cases is important, but
test cases are useful only if they can reveal faults. To
reveal faults, test cases must produce observable failures.
Observability requires appropriate test oracles. The “oracle
problem” is a challenging problem in many testing domains,
but with embedded systems it can be particularly difficult.
Embedded systems employing multiple tasks can have non-
deterministic output, which complicates the determination
of expected outputs for given inputs, and oracle automation.
Faults in embedded systems can produce effects on program
behavior or state which, in the context of particular test
executions, do not propagate to output, but do surface later in
the field. Thus, oracles that are strictly “output-based”, i.e.,
focusing on externally visible aspects of program behavior
such as writes to stdout and stderr, file outputs, and
observable signals, may fail to detect faults.
In this work we address this observability problem. We
present several “property-based” oracles that use instru-
mentation to record various aspects of execution behavior
and compare observed behavior to certain intended system
properties that can be derived through program analysis.
These can be used during testing to help engineers observe
specific system behaviors that reveal the presence of faults.
While creation of the oracles is manual, engineers can create
them for specific embedded systems platforms and then
reuse them on subsequent systems and releases constructed
on these platforms, and with less expense than required
by the current typical approach of manually constructing
output-based oracles for each test input.
The property-based oracles we study in this work fo-
cus on several important non-temporal attributes of system
behavior; in particular, attributes related to proper uses of
synchronization primitives and other mechanisms important
to managing cooperation and concurrency among tasks (e.g.,
semaphores, message passing protocols, and critical sec-
tions). Furthermore, we track these properties not just across
tasks at the application level, but also at lower system levels.
We present results of an empirical study of our approach
applied to two embedded system applications built on a
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commercial embedded system kernel. Our results show that
our property-based oracles can detect faults beyond those
detectable by simple output-based oracles.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are typically designed to perform
specific tasks in particular computational environments con-
sisting of software and hardware components. A typical
embedded system is structured in terms of four layers:
(1) the application layer, (2) the Operating System (OS)
layer, (3) the Hardware Adaptation Layer (HAL), and (4) the
underlying hardware substrate. Interfaces between these
layers provide access to, and observation points into, the
internal workings of each underlying layer.
Embedded system applications operate through interac-
tions between the application layer and lower layers, and in-
teractions between the various user tasks that are initiated in
the application layer. These include (1) interactions between
layers via interfaces, (2) interactions via information created
in one layer which then flows to other layers for processing,
and (3) interactions between multiple tasks working together
concurrently and coordinating their efforts via shared re-
sources. This motivates the use of testing approaches by
which application developers can test these interactions.
B. Testing Inter-Layer and Inter-Task Interactions
The foregoing classes of interactions can be modeled in
terms of data that flows across software layers, data that
flows between components within layers, and data that flows
between user tasks. Tracking data that flows across software
layers is important because applications use this to obtain
services and acquire resources in ways that may exercise
faults. Once data exchanged as part of these transactions
reaches a lower layer, tracking interactions between com-
ponents within that layer captures data propagation effects
that may lead to exposure of these faults. Finally, data that
flows through resources shared by user tasks can reveal
synchronization and other forms of faults.
In prior work [31], we thus investigated the use of
dataflow testing techniques which use static analysis to track
data usage in programs in terms of the potential flow of
data between definitions and uses of variables. We presented
two dataflow-based test adequacy criteria. The first criterion
tracks data dependencies representing interactions across
layers of the system at the intra-task level (i.e., within single
user tasks). These inter-layer dependencies are calculated
through an interprocedural dataflow analysis that identifies
definition-use pairs that correspond to interactions between
system layers and components of system services; i.e.,
those involving global variables, APIs for kernel and HAL
services, function parameters, physical memory addresses,
accesses to physical devices, and special registers.
Our second test adequacy criterion identifies inter-task
interactions in the form of definition-use pairs involving
shared variables that can be accessed by multiple user tasks
as they operate concurrently. These shared variables are
typically represented as global variables; they often represent
physical devices accessible to multiple user tasks through
memory mapped I/O. Typically, programmers use critical
sections to control access to these variables, e.g., by calling
kernel APIs to acquire/release semaphores or calling the
HAL API to disable/enable interrupt requests.
The two forms of definition-use pairs identified by our
adequacy criteria serve as testing requirements (coverage
targets) for use by engineers in testing embedded system
applications. We empirically studied the use of these criteria
in testing a commercial embedded system application. Our
results showed that our techniques can be effective [31].
C. Related Work
1) Testing Embedded Systems: Much of the research on
testing embedded systems has focused on temporal faults,
which arise when systems have hard real-time requirements.
Temporal faults are important, but many faults in embedded
systems are non-temporal, including algorithmic, logic, and
configuration errors, and misuse of resources [4], [18].
There has been some research on techniques for testing for
non-temporal faults or faults related to functional behavior
in embedded systems. Much of this work has used specifi-
cations (e.g., [5], [23]) and applies only when those spec-
ifications exist. Among non-specification-based approaches,
some test applications without targeting underlying software
components (e.g., [30], [32]) while others test software
components (e.g., kernels and device drivers) that underlie
the applications (e.g., [2], [33]). Certainly applications and
underlying components must each be tested, but on our view,
interactions among these must also be targeted.
There has been some work using dataflow analysis to
analyze properties of embedded systems [36], [37], how-
ever this work does not focus on testing. Lai et al. [21]
apply inter-context controlflow and dataflow test adequacy
criteria to wireless sensor network nesC applications. In this
work, an inter-context flow graph captures preemption and
resumption of executions among tasks at the application
layer and computes definition-use pairs involving shared
variables. While this work focuses on inter-task interactions,
it does not focus on interlayer interactions.
2) Testing Concurrency in Embedded Systems: A com-
mon approach used to test concurrent programs is to apply
static analysis techniques to discover paths and regions in
code that might be susceptible to concurrency faults (e.g.,
[11], [15], [34]). For example, static analysis techniques
based on state modeling and transitions (e.g., [10]) can verify
concurrent programs with respect to properties, and have
been used to verify correctness of low-level systems includ-
ing device drivers and kernels [3], [11]. One shortcoming of
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these techniques is state explosion, making them unscalable.
Further, due to imprecise local information and infeasible
paths, static analysis can report false positives.
Dynamic analysis tends to be more accurate than static
analysis in detecting concurrency faults (e.g., [12], [19],
[22], [28]). Dynamic techniques can also be used to permute
thread interleavings at runtime to expose more possible
faults. For example, active testing (e.g., [19], [28]) is used to
first identify potential concurrency faults, and then control
the underlying scheduler by inserting delays at context
switch points. The drawback of dynamic analysis, however,
is that it can detect faults only on executed paths.
Our goal is to utilize test cases to detect faults, and
in particular, faults involving run-time interactions between
applications and underlying system components and between
user tasks. Thus, we employ dynamic analysis. To overcome
the short-comings of dynamic analysis, however, we rely
on test adequacy criteria that target definition-use pairs
involving inter-layer and inter-task interactions. This allows
our test suites to cover richer sets of execution paths.
There are approaches for uncovering concurrency faults
by manipulating synchronization sequences (e.g., [6]). How-
ever, these approaches rely on program specifications and
ours does not.
There are also dynamic techniques that can observe con-
currency bug patterns without specifications. Such patterns
can be treated as one type of oracle. Wang et al. [35] pre-
define atomicity access patterns associated with locks, and
any execution that violates the patterns is reported as a fault.
Lu et al. [24] specify violated interleaving access patterns
regarding shared variables; an execution that matches the
pattern is a fault. These techniques detect only atomicity
violations, and they do not take variable accesses and states
in underlying components into consideration.
One major characteristic of our approach is the use of
synchronization properties as test oracles. Our synchroniza-
tion properties are similar to those used in program model
checking (e.g., [8], [13], [25]), a formal verification tech-
nique that exhaustively tests a model extracted from system
code. Our work also extracts synchronization properties
by inferring behaviors from component interfaces and/or
program semantics; however, instead of exploring full states,
our approach relies on a suite of test inputs that can change
runtime behaviors, exploring partial states and avoiding the
state explosion problem. These inputs can include those such
as priority order, task sleeping time, and task notification
disciplines (e.g., unblock one task, unblock all tasks). We
then employ low-level observation points to observe how
these test inputs affect the ability of applications to conform
to these synchronization properties.
A second major characteristic of our approach is that,
unlike most of the approaches discussed in this section, it
does not assume that underlying concurrent constructs are
correctly implemented. This is important, because many em-
bedded systems are developed as customized applications,
using lower-level software components (runtime services and
libraries) that are themselves heavily customized by in-house
software developers. In such cases, developers cannot treat
lower level components as black boxes in testing.
There is some prior research on using concurrency prop-
erties to test embedded systems. Higashi et al. [14] detect
data races caused by interrupt handlers via a mechanism that
causes interrupts to occur at all possible times. They have
applied the technique to test the uClinux real time kernel.
One major difference between this approach and ours is that
we do not artificially amplify the frequency of events to
evaluate whether these events can cause failures. Our tech-
nique identifies observation points in the low-level runtime
systems to observe interactions among system layers. The
runtime systems are not configured to behave unrealistically
except for instrumentation at observation points.
III. PROPERTY-BASED ORACLES
In this section, we describe our approach for creating
test oracles based on properties of various synchronization
primitives and common interprocess communications. There
are three general steps involved in applying the approach:
1) Create test oracles based on properties – this can be
done by analyzing the source programs to extract their
interfaces and the program semantics of particular
software components.
2) Execute test cases on the system and generate runtime
trace information – this requires instrumentation of the
source programs, OS, libraries, and runtime systems.
3) Analyze trace information to detect violations – this
involves checking generated traces against oracles to
verify conformance with properties of interest.
Our approach requires test engineers to create properties
relative to particular embedded systems platforms, and thus,
manual effort and expertise are required and some properties
will be platform dependent. Once created, however, these
properties are relevant to all applications built on those
platforms so the cost of defining properties for them is
amortized. This differs from output-based oracles, which are
also typically defined manually, but must be defined for each
test case and program individually.
It is possible to generalize the specification of a property
if that property is widely accepted or part of a standard.
For example, our approach includes creating an oracle for a
binary semaphore, the property for which can be found in
any operating system textbook [29]. In addition, while the
instrumentation of low-level runtime systems such as kernels
can be dependent on those systems, the overall approach can
be generalized (e.g., most OSs employ a similar conceptual
view of binary semaphores).
It is worth noting that there are existing runtime moni-
toring tools that can perform instrumentation and violation
detection automatically based on specifications [9]. The key
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notion in developing such automated tools is having a clear
understanding of the correct runtime properties and data
structures. In this work, we tackle the observability issue
by looking at multiple layers of software. As such, the
first step of our work is also to gain the insights about the
intricate dependencies between applications and the kernel
and among various kernel components. We achieve this
through instrumentation. As our work continues to mature,
we envision that we will be able to provide an automated tool
to instrument various layers of software, monitor relevant
events, and detect faults.
It should also be noted that our technique might false-
positively report errors in some pathological cases. As an
example, one property that our approach can detect is proper
pairing of critical section enter and exit statements. It is
possible that in some scenarios, a critical section exit might
be omitted without causing errors (e.g., a branch in a critical
section might lead directly to program termination). In this
scenario, our technique would still detect this as an error.
As a platform for implementing and studying our ap-
proach we chose rapid prototyping systems provided by
Altera [1]. The Altera platform runs under MicroC/OS-II, a
commercial grade real-time operating system. It is certified
to meet safety-critical standards in medical, military and
aerospace, telecommunication, and automotive applications.
The code base contains about 5000 lines of non-comment
C code [20]. For academic research, the source-code of
MicroC/OS-II is freely available.
Next, we illustrate the application of our approach to sup-
port property-based testing of two synchronization primitives
in MicroC/OS-II: semaphore and message queue. We then
apply the approach to critical sections. We select these three
primitives because, while in principle any primitives could
be checked with test cases created by any approach, these
three can all arguably be better checked by test suites created
in accordance with our test adequacy criteria. This is because
semaphores, message queues, and other shared resources are
modeled in embedded systems as variables and buffers, and
their usage and interactions can thus be tracked through
inter-layer and inter-task definition-use pairs.
A. Binary Semaphore
A semaphore is an integer variable that is accessed
through two atomic operations: pend and post. The pend
operation decrements the semaphore value by one. If the
semaphore value is already 0, the task that tries to perform
the pend operation is blocked. The post operation increments
the semaphore value by one if there are no tasks waiting on
the semaphore. If there are tasks waiting, the semaphore
value remains at 0, and the waiting task that has the highest
priority is admitted directly into the semaphore. A binary
semaphore can only contain a value of 0 or 1.
To apply our approach to such semaphores, we first
create an oracle based on state transition information. To
Format:
sem cnt = {0,1}
state = {B,R} //B for blocked, R for ready
A = {(T ,PEND),(T ,POST)}
S, S′ = {(T ,sem cnt,state)}
= {(T ,0,R),(T ,1,R),(T ,0,B)}
Oracle:
Case 1: accessed by the same task
<(Ti,1,R);(Ti,PEND);(Ti,0,R)>
<(Ti,0,R);(Ti,POST);(Ti,1,R)>
Case 2: accessed by different tasks
<(Ti,1,R);(Tj,PEND);(Tj,0,R)>
<(Ti,0,R);(Tj,POST);(Tj,1,R)>
<(Ti,0,R);(Tj,PEND);(Tj,0,B)>
<(Ti,0,B);(Tj,PEND);(Tj,0,B)>
<ALL{(Ti,0,B)};(Tj ,POST);
(highest priority task in ALL{Ti},0,R)∧(Tj ,0,R)>
Figure 1. Correct states for binary semaphores. In the last triple, the
semaphore value remains 0 after a post because MicroC/OS-II directly
admits a waiting task with the highest priority to the semaphore.
accomplish this task, we reason about the properties of pend
and post to calculate and encode all possible correct state
transitions for a semaphore.
We encode state information using a triple, S, that con-
tains (i) the identification of a task, T , that performed an
operation (pend, post, or initialize) on the semaphore, (ii) the
semaphore value after the operation, and (iii) the execution
state of that task after the operation (B for blocked state and
R for ready state). We record operation information using
a tuple A that contains (i) the identification of the task
that performs the operation, and (ii) the actual operation
performed on a semaphore. For each operation, we encode
the associated state transition as triples; each triple contains
<Si,Aj ,S
′
j>, where i and j denote task identifications and i
and j can but need not differ. Here, Si represents the state
before the operation, Aj represents the operation (pend or
post), and S′j represents the state after the operation. Each
of these operation triples represents a state transition due to
an operation performed on the semaphore.
Figure 1 shows the result of applying this process to the
states and transitions relevant to MicroC/OS-II.
Next, we wish to gather dynamic information from pro-
gram execution, to check against the oracle. To do this
we need to observe semaphore states; thus we instrument
kernel functions related to semaphore operations and task
scheduling to generate trace data including task id, operation,
semaphore identification and value, and execution state
(ready or blocked). For MicroC/OS-II these functions are
OSSemCreate, OSSemPend, OSSemPost, OS EventTaskWait,
and OS EventTaskRdy. We then execute the instrumented
system with test cases, generating traces. Next, we process
the generated traces to obtain information in the form
represented in the oracle. Finally, we compare the processed
data against the oracle to detect anomalies.
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Note that our technique can scale to work with multiple
semaphores. To achieve this, we identify transitions based
on operations on each semaphore (e.g., a set of transitions
for sem1 and another set for sem2). We can then check each
set of transitions against the oracle.
To illustrate an application of our technique we provide
an example. Suppose we are using a kernel that contains
a faulty implementation of binary semaphore. Suppose that
an instance of the faulty semaphore (sem1) is used in a pro-
gram with three tasks (Tmain, T1, and T2). The semaphore
is created and initialized to 1 by Tmain so the initial
state is (Tmain,1,R). T1 then performs a pend operation
on sem1, and the triple representing the state transition
of sem1 (Trans1) is <(Tmain,1,R);(T1,PEND);(T1,0,R)>.
Later, T2 performs a pend operation on sem1, and the
triple representing the state transition of sem1 (Trans2)
is <(T1,0,R);(T2,PEND);(T2,0,R)>. Some time later, the
program terminates without any obvious failures.
By comparing the dynamically generated state transitions
with the oracle, we can detect that Trans2 does not match
any of the transitions in the oracle, and therefore, is incor-
rect. When T1 previously performed a pend operation on
the semaphore, it left the semaphore value at 0. As such,
the pend operation performed by T2 should have caused
T2 to be blocked. However, this is not the case here as
the trace clearly shows that the state of T2 remains at
ready (R) after the pend operation. If the semaphore had
operated correctly, the correct transition would have been
<(T1,0,R);(T2,PEND);(T2,0,B)>.
B. Message Queue
MicroC/OS-II provides message queues as a way to sup-
port indirect communication. In this mechanism, messages
are sent to and received from a circular buffer with a user-
specified size. In the current implementation, MicroC/OS-
II returns an OS Q FULL error code when a task tries
to post a message to a fully occupied queue. In addition,
applications that use this facility typically prevent a task
from posting a message to a full buffer (e.g., by putting the
task in a busy-wait loop). Messages are consumed from the
queue in FIFO order. When the queue is empty, tasks that
try to receive messages are blocked. Application engineers
can specify that the highest priority task or all tasks must
unblock when a message is deposited into an empty queue.
To create the oracle for the message queue, we reason
about the send and receive operations to calculate all correct
state transitions. The oracle is the generalization of these
transitions (Figure 2). This process is similar to the one
used to generate state transition information for binary
semaphores. We encode the state information using a triple
S but replacing the semaphore value with the number of
messages in the buffer. We also record send and receive
operations using a tuple A. We represent transitions using
triples; each triple contains <Si,Aj ,S′j>, where i and j
Format:
msg cnt= {empty;num;full}, where (empty < num < full)
state = {B,R}
A = {(T ,RECV),(T ,SEND)}
S, S′ = {(T ,msg cnt,state)}
= {(T ,num,R),(T ,full,R),(T ,empty,B),(T ,empty,R)}
Oracle:
Case 1: accessed by the same task
<(Ti,empty,R);(Ti,RECV);(Ti,empty,B)>
<(Ti,empty,R);(Ti,SEND);(Ti,1,R)>
<(Ti,num,R);(Ti,RECV);(Ti,num-1,R)>
<(Ti,num,R);(Ti,SEND);(Ti,num+1,R)>
<(Ti,full,R);(Ti,SEND);(Ti,full,R)>
<(Ti,full,R);(Ti,RECV);(Ti,full-1,R)>
Case 2: accessed by different tasks
<(Ti,empty,R);(Tj ,RECV);(Tj,empty,B)>
<(Ti,empty,R);(Tj ,SEND);(Tj,1,R)>
<(Ti,empty,B);(Tj ,RECV);(Tj,empty,B)>
<ALL{(Ti,empty,B)};(Tj ,SEND);
broadcast?(ALL{Ti}:highest priority task in ALL{Ti},empty,R)>
<(Ti,num,R);(Tj ,RECV);(Tj,num-1,R)>
<(Ti,num,R);(Tj ,SEND);(Tj,num+1,R)>
<(Ti,full,R);(Tj,SEND);(Tj,full,R)>
<(Ti,full,R);(Tj,RECV);(Tj,full-1,R)>
Figure 2. Correct states for message queue
denote task identifications and i and j can but need not differ.
The correct state of a message queue in the fourth triple
of case 2 depends on whether the system is configured to
unblock only the highest priority task waiting for a message
or all the waiting tasks. If the broadcast option is selected,
then all the tasks in the waitlist are blocked; otherwise, only
the highest priority task is blocked.
To observe task states and queue status, we instrument the
MicroC/OS-II kernel’s functions related to message queue
operations and task scheduling (OSQCreate, OSQPend, OS-
QPostOpt, OS EventTaskWait, and OS EventTaskRdy) to
generate the required information.
We next run tests on the program to generate execution
traces. We process these traces to generate states of the
circular buffer and state transitions based on send and receive
operations. We then compare the dynamically generated
information with the oracle to detect anomalies. The process
is similar to that shown in the example used to illustrate fault
discovery with the binary semaphore.
C. Critical Section
Our approach to property-based testing of critical sections
differs somewhat from the approaches used for semaphores
and message queues. In the foregoing approaches we define
oracles, and these are directly used to compare against
dynamic information. In the case of critical sections, we
require an additional static analysis step to provide the data
that dynamic information is compared against.
The basic property of a critical section is that its contents
are mutually exclusive in time. That is, when a task is
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executing in a critical section, no other task is allowed to
execute in the same critical section [29]. This also means
that given a critical section in user task Tk that contains
a sequence of definitions and uses of shared variables
(SVs), these definitions and uses must be executed without
intervening accesses by other user tasks to the SVs.
To observe critical section behavior in this regard, we
could instrument functions related to critical section entry
and exit across all layers, as well as definitions and uses
of shared variables within each critical section. By statically
calculating the interlayer sequences of definitions and uses of
SVs (SV-sequences) that are associated with critical sections
in a given embedded system application, we can then later
compare dynamic sequences obtained in testing against
expected sequences and check for anomalies.
We describe the two steps by which this process is
accomplished first, and then we provide the oracle.
Step 1: Calculate static SV-sequences. To calculate static
SV-sequence information for a given critical section k, we
apply an algorithm that utilizes an interprocedural control
flow graph (ICFG) [27] for the application under test, and
performs a depth-first traversal of the portion of the ICFG
created for a given user task Ti beginning at the critical
section entry node CSenterk for k. During this traversal
the algorithm identifies and records the SVs encountered.
This process results in the incremental construction of
SV-sequence information as the traversal continues. If the
algorithm reaches a predicate node in the ICFG during its
traversal, it creates independent copies of the SV-sequences
collected thus far to carry down each branch. If a back edge
is encountered (i.e., there is a loop), the collected SVs in
this branch are enclosed by parentheses, followed by a +,
meaning that such SVs can be repeated. On reaching the
critical section exit (CSexitk ), the algorithm generates CSk,
which contains the set of collected SV-sequences, CSenterk ,
and CSexitk for task Ti and critical section k.
Step 2: Calculate dynamic SV-sequences. To observe criti-
cal section behavior, we instrument functions related to criti-
cal section entry and exit, as well as shared variables within
the critical section. Instrumentation is done at the bound-
aries of each critical section across all layers and at each
definition and use within it. For MicroC/OS-II, the bound-
aries are OSSemPend, OSSemPost, OS ENTER CRITICAL,
OS EXIT CRITICAL, alt irq enable, and alt irq disable.
Next, the program is run with tests and dynamic
definition-use information is collected, for each user task,
on SVs occurring in critical sections. This information is
then processed with a focus on the SV-sequences associated
with each critical section to obtain sets of dynamic SV-
sequences. Finally, the sets of dynamic SV-sequences (CSk)
are validated against the static SV-sequences in accordance
with the properties listed in the oracle shown in Figure 3.
Oracle:
CSk: static SV-sequences in critical section k for task Ti.
1) For each CSenterk of task Ti there must be a matching
CSexitk retrieved from CSk of Ti.
2) A critical section must not be simultaneously accessed by
multiple tasks.
3) A dynamic sequence between CSenterk and CSexitk for
task Ti must match with its corresponding static du sequence
retrieved from CSk of Ti.
Figure 3. Correct properties for critical section
D. Discussion on Effects of Instrumentation
As noted above, we instrument the kernel to obtain
observability of low-level runtime systems. Such instrumen-
tation can change system states (e.g., cache, bus, and register
usage) and prolong execution time. As a way to eliminate
the effects of instrumentation on system states, we are
working to create a non-intrusive instrumentation framework
based on virtual machines. Presently, we are able to capture
control-flow information without instrumenting the source
code [7]. Our next step is to extend this framework to capture
dataflow information without source code instrumentation.
We foresee that the instrumentation framework will enhance
the capability and usability of our property-based oracles.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Our property-based oracles are intended to help engineers
detect faults in embedded system applications that might
not be detectable by output-based oracles alone. We thus
designed an empirical study to examine whether this occurs.
A. Objects of Analysis
As objects of study we chose two embedded systems
applications that are provided with the Altera platform. The
first application, MAILBOX, involves the use of mailboxes
by several user tasks. The second application, CIRCULAR-
BUFFER, involves the use of semaphores by two user tasks,
and a circular buffer that operates as a message queue by
three tasks. Table I provides basic statistics on these objects,
including the numbers of lines of non-comment code in the
application and lower layers, and the numbers of functions
in the application or invoked in lower layers.
To evaluate our approaches, we required faulty versions of
our object programs. To obtain these we asked a programmer
with over ten years of experience with embedded systems,
but with no knowledge of our testing approach, to follow
a fault injection guide and taxonomy and insert potential
faults into the applications and into the MicroC/OS-II system
(kernel and HAL) code. Potential faults seeded in the
code were related to kernel initialization, task creation and
deletion, scheduling, resource creation, resource handling
interrupt handling, and critical section management.
Given a set of potential faults, we followed [17] in taking
two additional steps to ensure that our fault detection results
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Table I
OBJECT PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS
Program Application Kernel and HAL Definition-use Pairs Test Cases
LOC Funcs Faults LOC Funcs Faults Intratask Intertask Black-box White-box
MAILBOX 268 9 16 2380 32 39 253 65 26 24
CIRCULARBUFFER 304 17 17 2814 38 49 394 96 40 44
are valid. First we determined, through code inspection and
program execution, which potential faults could never be
detected by test cases. These included potential faults that
were actually semantically equivalent to the original code,
or that had been placed in lower layer code that could never
be executed in the context of our particular applications, and
we eliminated these. Second, after creating test cases for
our application (described below), we eliminated any faults
that were detected by more than 50% of those test cases.
Such faults are likely to be detected during unit testing,
and are thus not appropriate for assessing the strength of
system-level testing approaches. This process left us with
the numbers of faults reported in Table I (the table lists
these separately for the application and Kernel/HAL levels).
B. Variables, Measures, and Other Factors
Independent Variable. Our independent variable is the
oracle approach used. We consider two: output-based and
property-based. As property-based oracles we implemented
those described in Section III.
To provide output-based oracles, on MAILBOX, we used
a differencing tool on the outputs of the initial and faulty
versions of the program to determine, for each test case t and
fault f , whether t revealed f . This allows us to assess the
power of the test suites by combining the results measured
for individual test cases.
On CIRCULARBUFFER a simple output-differencing ap-
proach would not suffice, because like many embedded sys-
tems its output can be non-deterministic. However, engineers
faced with such systems typically create partial oracles that
can check important aspects of system behavior, and we took
this approach. On outputs that correspond to exceptional
behavior resulting in error messages, output does remain
deterministic and was simply differenced. In other cases,
we utilized several automatable checks of expected output;
namely, (1) “the number of messages received must be less
than or equal to the number sent;” (2) “the semaphore must
be held by the task whose number of semaphores acquired is
not equal to zero”; and (3) “deterministic portions of output
strings must match expected contents.”
Dependent Variable. As a dependent variable we focus on
effectiveness in terms of the ability of the oracles to reveal
faults. To achieve this we measured the numbers of faults in
our object programs detected by the two oracle approaches.
Additional Factors. To help reduce potential threats to
internal validity, we also consider one additional factor. Like
many embedded system applications, our object programs
run in infinite loops. Although semantically a loop iteration
count of two is sufficient to cause the programs to execute
one cycle, different iteration counts may have different
powers to reveal faulty behavior in the interactions between
the user tasks and the kernel. To capture these differences
we utilized two iteration counts for all executions, 10 and
100. We selected these iteration counts following prelimi-
nary studies of iterations ranging from 5 to 5000, because
increases up to 100 were observed to cause fault-detection
differences, while further increases above that did not.
C. Study Operation
As test suites we utilize code coverage-based test suites
engineered specifically to provide coverage of inter-layer and
inter-task definition-use pairs (see Section II). To create these
we followed a current typical practice: creating initial black-
box test suites and then augmenting these for coverage.
To create initial black-box test suites we used the
category-partition method [26], which employs a Test Spec-
ification Language (TSL) to encode choices of parameters
and environmental conditions that affect system operations
(e.g., changes in priorities of user tasks) and combine them
into test inputs. This yielded initial black-box test suites of
sizes reported in Table I.
The application of our dataflow analysis techniques to our
object programs identified definition-use pairs (see Table I).
We executed the TSL test suites on the programs and
determined their coverage of inter-layer and inter-task pairs.
We then augmented the initial TSL test suite to ensure
coverage of all the executable inter-layer and inter-task
definition-use pairs. This process resulted in the creation of
additional test cases as reported in Table I.
We executed our test suites on all of the faulty versions
of each object program, with one fault activated on each
execution. We then applied each output- and property-based
oracle to each test execution; this was done independently
per oracle and per test case to avoid conflating results.
D. Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity for this study
involves the representativeness of our object programs,
faults, and test suites. Other systems may exhibit different
behaviors and cost-benefit tradeoffs, as may other forms of
test suites. However, the system we utilized is a commercial
kernel, the faults were inserted by an experienced program-
mer following a fault injection guide and taxonomy, and the
test suites are created using practical processes.
The primary threat to internal validity for this study is
possible faults in the implementation of our techniques and
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in the tools that we use to perform evaluation. We controlled
for this threat by extensively testing our tools and verifying
their results against a smaller program for which we can
determine correct results. Our choices of iteration limits may
also affect fault detection results but we used reasonable care
in exploratory steps to choose meaningful limits.
Where construct validity is concerned, fault detection
effectiveness is just one variable of interest. Other metrics,
including the costs of applying the approach and the human
costs of creating and managing tests, are also of interest.
E. Results
Figure 4 provides an overview of our fault detection data.
The figure displays segmented bar graphs, one per object
program. Each bar graph partitions the faults detected in the
program into three disjoint subsets. The white segment of the
bar corresponds to faults detected by output oracles only, the
black segment corresponds to faults detected by property-
based oracles only, and the gray segment corresponds to
faults detected by both types of oracles.
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Figure 4. Overview of fault detection data
As the figure shows, 36 of the 55 faults in MAILBOX were
detected, and 47 of the 66 faults in CIRCULARBUFFER were
detected. Of the 36 faults detected in MAILBOX, 34 were
detected by output-based oracles and 14 were detected by
property-based oracles. Of the 47 faults detected in CIR-
CULARBUFFER, 36 were detected by output-based oracles
and 26 were detected by property-based oracles. Clearly,
output-based oracles were more effective than property-
based oracles at detecting faults overall, but in the absence
of output-based oracles, property-based oracles would still
have revealed substantial numbers of faults.
Considering the data further, in MAILBOX, two faults
were detected only by property-based oracles, and in CIR-
CULARBUFFER, 11 were detected only by property-based
oracles. Property-based oracles thus also displayed the po-
tential to detect faults not caught by output-based oracles.
Figure 5 uses a similar graphical approach to partition
results further, displaying fault detection per program and
property-based oracle type, separated by the system layer
in which the faults resided (application versus kernel/HAL).
For CIRCULARBUFFER, results are shown for each of the
three property-based oracle types. For MAILBOX, results are
shown only for the critical section property-based oracle
because MAILBOX does not utilize semaphores or message
queues. Note that in the case of CIRCULARBUFFER, the
sets of faults detected per property-based oracle type are
not disjoint; that is, some faults are detected by multiple
property-based oracles. Layers, however, do form disjoint
partitions on faults per program; e.g., of the 36 faults
detected in MAILBOX, 16 were in the application layer and
the other 20 were in the kernel/HAL layers.
We first consider results across property-based oracles.
All three such oracles were successful in revealing faults.
The message queue oracle revealed the most faults, and the
semaphore oracle the fewest, on CIRCULARBUFFER. More
significantly, the property-based oracles each revealed faults
that were not revealed by the output-based oracles. The crit-
ical section oracle revealed seven such faults, the semaphore
oracle revealed three, and the message queue oracle revealed
three. Further, each of the 13 faults that were revealed only
by a property-based oracle were actually revealed only by
one particular property-based oracle. In other words, each
property-based oracle exhibited the potential to reveal faults
not revealed by any other property-based oracle.
We next consider differences in fault detection results
across system layers. Faults detected by both property-
based and output-based oracles occurred in equal numbers
in the application and kernel/HAL layers (15 each). Faults
detected only by property-based oracles, however, resided
disproportionally in the kernel/HAL layers. More precisely,
at the application layer, across all properties, property-based
oracles detected only three faults that were not detected by
output-based oracles (all on CIRCULARBUFFER), while at
the kernel/HAL layers, property-based oracles detected 10
faults that were not detected by output-based oracles (two
on MAILBOX and eight on CIRCULARBUFFER).
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Figure 5. Detailed fault detection data
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V. RESULTS SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
While additional studies are needed, if the results we have
just reported generalize, then: (1) the property-based oracles
we have defined are effective at detecting faults, and can
detect faults not detected by output-based oracle; and (2)
each property-based oracle demonstrated the ability to detect
faults not detected by others.
These results have several implications. They suggest that
output-based and property-based oracles are complementary
in fault detection effectiveness and ideally both should be
used. However, although output-based oracles may detect
more faults than property-based oracles, in cases where
output-based oracles are not operable property-based oracles
can still be useful. Moreover, the creation of output-based
oracles is itself time-consuming and manual and must be
performed per test case, and these oracles must then be
maintained over the system lifetime. It follows that it may
be preferable to apply property-based oracles before output-
based oracles, because if they do identify failing test cases
this obviates the need to spend time using and inspecting
output-based oracles for these test cases.
We also observed a much larger number of failures
revealed only by property-based oracles on CIRCULAR-
BUFFER (11) than on MAILBOX (2). Of course, more of
the property-based oracles were applicable to the former
program, but the result might also reflect the use of a
partial oracle for CIRCULARBUFFER. We conjecture that on
programs where weaker output-based oracles are required,
property-based oracles could have even greater power to
reveal faults that might not otherwise be seen.
Examining the data further yielded additional observa-
tions. First, while our property-based oracles could conceiv-
ably produce false warnings, they did not do so in any case
in our studies. Inspection of our results revealed that in every
case in which a property-based oracle signaled a problem in
our study, a fault caused the problem.
Second, in Section IV we noted that iteration counts can
conceivably cause differences in program behavior relative
to fault detection. In our study we observed such differences
only in four cases, all involving faults detected by the critical
section property-based oracle (three on Mailbox and one
on CircularBuffer). In all four of these cases, faults
were detected at iteration level 100 but not at iteration
level 10. Choice of iteration level thus can matter, but in
our case it did not do so extensively.
Third, as noted in Section IV, the test suites that we
utilized were composed of black box test cases, augmented
with test cases needed to achieve coverage of inter-layer
and inter-task definition-use pairs (as defined in Section II.)
Of the 40 faults detected by property-based oracles, 32
were detected by the initial black-box test cases, and 39
were detected by the white-box test cases. This result has
two implications: (1) when using specification-based (TSL)
test cases, property-based oracles can be effective, but their
effectiveness increases when test suites are augmented to
cover inter-layer and inter-task definition-use pairs; (2) just
the test cases created to add additional coverage above
those used initially for black-box testing were adequate to
achieve most of the property-based fault detection. This
result lends credence to our conjecture (Section III) that the
dataflow coverage-based test cases created by our approach
can be particularly effective at detecting the failures that are
detectable using our specific property-based oracles.
Fourth, four of the faults present in MAILBOX involved
changes in task sleeping times at the application layer. Such
faults are common because sleeping times are embedded as
constants by programmers and can easily be chosen incor-
rectly. Our black-box test cases detect all four of these faults
using output-based oracles at iteration count 10. Critical
section analysis, however, revealed three of these at iteration
count 10 using the same test cases. While all three of these
faults were revealed by additional coverage-based test cases,
and were revealed by black-box test cases at iteration count
100, this result does illustrate the potential power of critical
section analysis to detect faults in situations where particular
test cases themselves (together with a choice of iteration
level) might not.
Finally, we analyzed our data to determine what types
of faults were revealed only by our property-based oracles.
Of these 13 faults, many have to do with incorrect task
initialization, improper semaphore creation, incorrect pairing
of critical section enter and exit statements, and incorrect bit
operations in the scheduler or wait list, causing tasks to be
incorrectly blocked or unblocked. There are two particular
faults that are especially interesting since they do not result
in incorrect outputs or abnormal program terminations. The
first fault involves incorrect usage of a binary operator in
a kernel’s interrupt service routine; this results in multiple
tasks concurrently accessing a critical section. Another fault
involves improper usage of a unary operator. In this scenario,
the system is configured to unblock all tasks when a message
arrives; however, only the highest priority task is unblocked
in practice. While neither fault causes incorrect system
output on the employed test cases, both could emerge during
deployment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an approach for using property-based
oracles when testing embedded systems. We have conducted
an empirical study applying our techniques to two commer-
cial embedded system applications, and demonstrated that
they can be effective at revealing faults.
In addition to the need to perform additional empirical
work, there are several other avenues for future work. We
have already discussed prospects for using simulation plat-
forms to create non-intrusive instrumentation environments.
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We also see the potential for creating other types of property-
based oracles, including those for high-level concurrent
programming constructs for multi-task embedded software
(e.g., monitors) and real-time properties. Finally, the insights
obtained from this work can lead to the development of
tools that can automate the instrumentation process, monitor
runtime events, and detect faults.
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